Je ne suis pas contente! ― 2014/06/16 00:03:29
つねづね不思議なことがある。
なぜASAHIネットはさまざまな調査で 「顧客満足度第1位」とかなんとか、そうした類いの栄誉に浴しているのだろう？
●年連続○○ランキング第1位！ とか、そんな言葉がトップページには踊っているし、ウイキペディアのASAHIネットの項には過去の華々しいランキング歴も記載されている。
なぜ？ なぜそんなにみんな満足してるの？ ほかのプロバイダと何が違うの？
私はほかのプロバイダは使ったことがないので、何がそんなによいのかじぇんじぇんわかりません。ほかのプロバイダにはできないことを、ASAHIネットはしてくれているのか？
お前は比較検討もしないでプロバイダを決めたのか、とお思いであろうか。
実はそうなのだ（笑）。
ある人が「インターネットって楽しいわよ〜」と、私にキョーレツな勢いで「インターネットライフ」を勧めたのだ。10年くらい（もっとかな）前のことだ。
その人は関東の人だったが、リタイアした夫はそのまま家で年金生活、息子と娘はそれぞれ独立して勤務地に住んでいる。彼女は、初めは京都で勤める娘のアパートにときどき来ていたのが、すっかり京都が好きになり、ほぼ毎週のように通う生活をしばらく続けたあと、住み着くことに決めたのだそうだ。
娘さんが転勤でよそへ引っ越したそのあとに、母親がちゃっかり住み続けているというわけだった。
ひょんなことから知り合ったが、そのときすでに、京都生まれで京都居住歴ほぼ40年の私をはるかに凌駕して、彼女は京都のことをよく知っていた。観光ガイドだってできそうだった。ひたすら歩いて、頭の中にはすっかり京都ウォーキングマップができあがっていて、抜け道案内だってできそうだった。穴場スポットとか、知る人ぞ知る隠れ家的名所、みたいな知識まで豊富だった。
私は舌を巻いた。このひと、なにもん？ 本でも書くつもりなのかな。……しかし彼女にはそんな下心はまるでなく、ただただ京都を気に入っただけなのだった。
そして京都を愛してやまないのだった。
知れば知るほどその奥深さの深みにはまって蟻地獄的状態なの、などと言う。京都への愛はつきないのであった。
京都を深く愛してくださるのはよいが、「ご家族みなさんばらばらなんですね」。寂しくないですか、と尋ねた私に「連絡網はバッチリよ！」と得意満面でいう。
家族はそれぞれが遠方で暮らしているので「ヘタすると息子なんかすぐ音沙汰なしになっちゃうでしょ」。家族の絆を安易に断たないために始めたインターネットは彼女たち家族にとって「便利よ〜」
このうえないツールだったのだ。
「なんでもメールで知らせ合うわよ。家族だけがアクセスできる掲示板も持ってるし」。ふーん、そんな使いかたもあるのか。当時すでに仕事でインターネットを利用していたのでどういうものかを知っているつもりだったが、私はインターネットとはあくまで産官学連携の便宜を図るものでありその情報共有を促す目的で存在すると思っていたのが、一般家庭でフル活用されているとは。
彼女宅で契約しているプロバイダがASAHIネットであった。
「インターネットでね、趣味のお友達もできるわよ！」という彼女は、京都探訪記を綴っているとも言っていた。それが公開されているのか、家族間の閉じた場だったかは聞かなかったけど。とりあえずとても楽しそうで、しきりにASAHIネットへの加入を勧めるのであった。理由は、「友達紹介したら3000円」キャンペーン中だったからだ（笑）。「私は3000円もらえるし、あなたは何か月か無料になるわよ」
そろそろ家でもネットにつなぎたい
とちょうど思い始めたときだったので、彼女の説明をひととおり聞いて「まあ、これでいいか」と即座に判断したわけである。
ほかのプロバイダ
については何の調査も検討もしなかった。
我が家での「インターネットライフ」は突然始まって、思いのほかスムーズに滑り出し、彼女も3000円のショッピングボンドを受け取った。めでたしめでたし。
……というわけにはいかないのである。
私はかれこれ10年もユーザーやってんのに、加入以来何か「お得」なことに与った記憶は何もない。
料金優遇されるとか、ポイントがつくとか（笑。要らんけど）。
何もない。
アサブロでは、ブログはひとつしか持てない。2つめからは新たなユーザー登録が必要で、有料だ。なんだいそれ。
私はアサブロのほかに3つブログを持っているけど、どれも無料で開設できる。
アサブロは「広告などは入りません、すっきり！」なんてのが謳い文句にあるけど、私が利用している他のブログサービスはいずれもアサブロ同様にサイドバーや記事下に勝手に広告が入ったりすることは、いっさいない。でも無料。
画像は何十点も一度にアップロードできるし、写真のタテ・ヨコも自動判断して適切に読み込んでくれる。数秒ごとに自動保存してくれるからつねに最新状態がキープされている。アサブロは
、もっちろん編集中に自動保存なんてしてくれない。保存するたび管理画面に戻される。エディタ機能を使わないと複数の写真をブログ記事に載せることはできないばかりか、画像アップロードは1点ずつしかできないし、そのうえ時間がすごくかかるし、しかも写真のタテ・ヨコを判別できない。
おまけに、エントリー中にいきなりログイン画面に戻る。なんなん、これ。
それまで書いた記事、レイアウトは無に帰するのだ。エディタで書いていてもふつうに書いていても、よくある。
アサブロのアタマがパンクしたってことなんだろうけど、そんなに頻繁に卓袱台ひっくり返されると困るのよ、お母さんは。
他のブログサービスでは同じように大量の画像を扱っても、ながながとつらつらと書いていても、途中で放り出してゼロにするなんて、そんな無礼な振る舞いはない。
写真のタテヨコを判別できないなら、画像を回転させる機能をつけてくれ。
くだらないシール機能とかあまり可愛くもかっこよくもないデザインテンプレートとかうじゃうじゃ要らないから、複数の画像をアップできる機能をもたせてくれ。
管理画面トップにいつも出るインフォメーション、2012年のまま止まってるけど、更新しないならインフォ欄なんて辞めたらどうなんだろう。
それに、あの前世紀の遺物のようなWEBメール、どうにかならないのだろうか。
ほんとうは、初め「いちご栽培＆収穫の記録」をながなが綴っていたが、途中でアサブロのエディタはやる気をなくしてログイン画面に切り替わってくれた。ほんま、親切。
みんな、ASAHIネットの何が、満足なのだろう？
Dishonest Abe ― 2014/06/29 09:32:50
「嘘つきアベ」
（コピペしただけなので単語が分かれちゃってる箇所があるかもです。ごめんなさい）
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/24/dishonest_abe_article_nine_japan_constitution
（米国外交専門誌Foreign Policy最新号より）
Dishonest Abe
Why we should be worried about the Japanese prime minister's move to amend the constitution.
BY BRUCE ACKERMAN , TOKUJIN MATSUDAIRA JUNE 24, 2014
As Iraq disintegrates before the U.S. administration's eyes, it is ignoring news from Japan that is no less ominous. Without attracting much international attention, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is attempting a constitutional coup: trying to repeal basic tenets of the constitution without obtaining the support of the Japanese people in a special referendum.
In the aftermath of World War II, Article Nine of Japan's new constitution "forever renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Abe believes that the rise of China and the unpredictability of North Korea require military responses that the constitution renounced. It is up to him to convince the Japanese people that he's right -- but not by short-circuiting a referendum to achieve a radical change through unconstitutional means. If his coup is successful, it will establish a precedent that will permit the further destruction of the country's liberal democratic legacy.
Thus far, U.S. President Barack Obama has allowed Abe to embark on his mission without protest. But continued passivity will undercut the moral foundations of U.S. Asia policy for generations to come.
Over the past two years, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has won sweeping electoral victories on the basis of economic policies that have begun to lift Japan out of the doldrums -- raising business confidence to the highest levels since the global recession. But the constitution doesn't allow the prime minister to use the popularity he has gained from economic success to revolutionize fundamental values -- in this case, Japan's commitment to pacifism. Instead, the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in both houses before any amendment can be submitted to the voters. Only if a majority then approves at a referendum can the initiative become law. Yet Abe lacks the necessary parliamentary majorities -- the LDP, along with coalition partner New Komeito, controls a two-thirds majority in the lower house, but only 55 percent of the seats in the upper house. What is more, the electorate has turned decisively against his amendment campaign -- a June poll from the respected Kyodo News reports that 55 percent of the public oppose Abe's initiative, up from 48 percent in May.
Soon after Abe regained power in Dec. 2012, he launched a campaign to weaken the amendment procedure, so that only a simple majority in both houses would be required before going to the voters. But his strategy backfired: It estranged, rather than mobilized, popular support.
Abe then switched tactics, and began pursuing the same objective by more devious means. In the Japanese system, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is the government office in charge of constitutional and statutory interpretation. It had long viewed Article Nine as banning even those military actions authorized as legitimate self-defense under the United Nations Charter. Since August, Abe has been pressuring lawyers at the bureau to revise this position. In May, he finally succeeded. The agency is now reinterpreting Article Nine to authorize a wide range of preemptive military actions in the name of collective self-defense. And now, without seeking a legislative mandate in support of this basic change, he is pressuring his Cabinet to accept it.
Abe's current proposal, presented in June, would authorize military force if "the country's existence, the lives of the people, their freedoms, and the right to seek happiness are feared to be profoundly threatened because of an armed attack on Japan or other countries." The last three words are significant, as they authorize Japan to use force in defense of the United States or other close allies. Such preemptive attacks -- including the authority to use the military to break embargos on oil or food so long as the "right to seek happiness" is endangered -- go far beyond the principles of self-defense authorized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and erase Article Nine's emphatic renunciation of "the threat or use of force."
Despite the extreme nature of the proposed revisions, Abe seems to be overcoming his coalition partner's resistance. While New Komeito may eliminate some of the broader reinterpretations as a face-saving measure, it may go along with a constitutional revolution by unconstitutional means -- unless public opinion at home and abroad emphatically oppose the move.
There is more at stake than Article Nine. The 1947 constitution was written under U.S. occupation, and the imperial government accepted it without submitting it to voters in a referendum. Since then, it has never been amended. If the Abe government gained the two-thirds legislative majorities required for a popular referendum this would permit Japanese people of the 21st century to claim ownership over their constitutional destiny, and thereby consolidate the nation's standing as one of Asia's leading democracies.
In contrast, if Abe unilaterally modifies the constitution, and treats the referendum procedure with contempt, it would create a terrible precedent for further constitutional coups. For example, Article 97 of the constitution declares that "the fundamental human rights ... guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they ... are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate." But the LDP has already prepared a draft that eliminates this statement of principle. The draft also contains a provision restricting freedom of speech and association "for the purpose of harming the public interest and public order." Once Abe has evaded the requirements for constitutional amendment in the case of Article Nine, what is to stop him from undermining Japan's constitutional legacy through more acts of Orwellian "reinterpretation"?
During Obama's April trip to Japan, the two leaders held a joint press conference, where Abe announced that "wide-ranging security and defensive cooperation would be promoted."
But at what price? To eliminate false impressions left by the press conference, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy should state that the United States only supports military collaboration when it is in strict conformity with Article Nine. More fundamentally, the Obama administration should not prioritize seeking Japanese help in dealing with short-term provocations from other Asian powers. Instead, it is far more important to secure Japan's place as a mature democracy in the region. The alternative is unacceptable.
（コピペしただけなので単語が分かれちゃってる箇所があるかもです。ごめんなさい）
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/24/dishonest_abe_article_nine_japan_constitution
（米国外交専門誌Foreign Policy最新号より）
Dishonest Abe
Why we should be worried about the Japanese prime minister's move to amend the constitution.
BY BRUCE ACKERMAN , TOKUJIN MATSUDAIRA JUNE 24, 2014
As Iraq disintegrates before the U.S. administration's eyes, it is ignoring news from Japan that is no less ominous. Without attracting much international attention, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is attempting a constitutional coup: trying to repeal basic tenets of the constitution without obtaining the support of the Japanese people in a special referendum.
In the aftermath of World War II, Article Nine of Japan's new constitution "forever renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Abe believes that the rise of China and the unpredictability of North Korea require military responses that the constitution renounced. It is up to him to convince the Japanese people that he's right -- but not by short-circuiting a referendum to achieve a radical change through unconstitutional means. If his coup is successful, it will establish a precedent that will permit the further destruction of the country's liberal democratic legacy.
Thus far, U.S. President Barack Obama has allowed Abe to embark on his mission without protest. But continued passivity will undercut the moral foundations of U.S. Asia policy for generations to come.
Over the past two years, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has won sweeping electoral victories on the basis of economic policies that have begun to lift Japan out of the doldrums -- raising business confidence to the highest levels since the global recession. But the constitution doesn't allow the prime minister to use the popularity he has gained from economic success to revolutionize fundamental values -- in this case, Japan's commitment to pacifism. Instead, the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in both houses before any amendment can be submitted to the voters. Only if a majority then approves at a referendum can the initiative become law. Yet Abe lacks the necessary parliamentary majorities -- the LDP, along with coalition partner New Komeito, controls a two-thirds majority in the lower house, but only 55 percent of the seats in the upper house. What is more, the electorate has turned decisively against his amendment campaign -- a June poll from the respected Kyodo News reports that 55 percent of the public oppose Abe's initiative, up from 48 percent in May.
Soon after Abe regained power in Dec. 2012, he launched a campaign to weaken the amendment procedure, so that only a simple majority in both houses would be required before going to the voters. But his strategy backfired: It estranged, rather than mobilized, popular support.
Abe then switched tactics, and began pursuing the same objective by more devious means. In the Japanese system, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is the government office in charge of constitutional and statutory interpretation. It had long viewed Article Nine as banning even those military actions authorized as legitimate self-defense under the United Nations Charter. Since August, Abe has been pressuring lawyers at the bureau to revise this position. In May, he finally succeeded. The agency is now reinterpreting Article Nine to authorize a wide range of preemptive military actions in the name of collective self-defense. And now, without seeking a legislative mandate in support of this basic change, he is pressuring his Cabinet to accept it.
Abe's current proposal, presented in June, would authorize military force if "the country's existence, the lives of the people, their freedoms, and the right to seek happiness are feared to be profoundly threatened because of an armed attack on Japan or other countries." The last three words are significant, as they authorize Japan to use force in defense of the United States or other close allies. Such preemptive attacks -- including the authority to use the military to break embargos on oil or food so long as the "right to seek happiness" is endangered -- go far beyond the principles of self-defense authorized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and erase Article Nine's emphatic renunciation of "the threat or use of force."
Despite the extreme nature of the proposed revisions, Abe seems to be overcoming his coalition partner's resistance. While New Komeito may eliminate some of the broader reinterpretations as a face-saving measure, it may go along with a constitutional revolution by unconstitutional means -- unless public opinion at home and abroad emphatically oppose the move.
There is more at stake than Article Nine. The 1947 constitution was written under U.S. occupation, and the imperial government accepted it without submitting it to voters in a referendum. Since then, it has never been amended. If the Abe government gained the two-thirds legislative majorities required for a popular referendum this would permit Japanese people of the 21st century to claim ownership over their constitutional destiny, and thereby consolidate the nation's standing as one of Asia's leading democracies.
In contrast, if Abe unilaterally modifies the constitution, and treats the referendum procedure with contempt, it would create a terrible precedent for further constitutional coups. For example, Article 97 of the constitution declares that "the fundamental human rights ... guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they ... are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate." But the LDP has already prepared a draft that eliminates this statement of principle. The draft also contains a provision restricting freedom of speech and association "for the purpose of harming the public interest and public order." Once Abe has evaded the requirements for constitutional amendment in the case of Article Nine, what is to stop him from undermining Japan's constitutional legacy through more acts of Orwellian "reinterpretation"?
During Obama's April trip to Japan, the two leaders held a joint press conference, where Abe announced that "wide-ranging security and defensive cooperation would be promoted."
But at what price? To eliminate false impressions left by the press conference, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy should state that the United States only supports military collaboration when it is in strict conformity with Article Nine. More fundamentally, the Obama administration should not prioritize seeking Japanese help in dealing with short-term provocations from other Asian powers. Instead, it is far more important to secure Japan's place as a mature democracy in the region. The alternative is unacceptable.
